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The authors provide critical insights into the creation of precarious and unfree labour in 
Ghana and Myanmar by examining the inner workings of the migration industry and the roles 
of brokers, the state and employers in positioning migrants in exploitative work in Libya, The 
Middle East, Singapore and Thailand.  The evidence is based on in-depth interviews with 
returned and current migrant construction workers and domestic workers, formal and informal 
brokers, transport providers and other stakeholders. The research shows that brokerage is 
culturally embedded in local systems of reciprocity and closely depends on the collusion and 
cooptation of state actors. The research suggests that rather than viewing migrants and those 
who mediate migration in opposition and the state as a benevolent facilitator, they should be 
analysed as co-constituting systems of brokerage, irregular migration and exploitative work. 
The findings highlight the need for states to take greater responsibility in managing their own 
involvement in creating modern slavery. At the same time, the findings highlight the ways in 
which migrants use brokerage to exercise agency by taking advantage of irregular migration 
routes and informal employment.  
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Forced labour, human trafficking, modern slavery, debt-migration and other manifestations of 
unfree labour are endemic in global supply chains and the lowest tiers of services and 
manufacturing in a variety of sectors including agriculture, construction, fisheries and 
plantations (Le Baron and Phillips 2017; Guérin 2013). We compare the manifestations of 
unfree labour in migration for low-skilled work in Myanmar and Ghana and examine the role 
of brokers, the migrants themselves and the state in creating and perpetuating it. Although in 
different continents, the two countries have striking similarities in terms of development 
indicators. Both have a significant proportion of their populations living in poverty and 
migration for low paid and low skilled work such as construction work, work in fisheries, 
care work and domestic work are widespread. The two countries also have extensive 
networks of brokers who have emerged in response to inaccessible emigration procedures, 
increasing restrictions on migration and are embedded in cultures where economic 
transactions and trade occur through market intermediaries (Awumbila et al 2018; Deshingkar 
2018; Deshingkar et al 2019).  
 
The research sought to investigate the inner workings and operational logic of brokers, the 
state and employers in positioning migrants in precarious work and creating unfree labour in 
Libya, Kuwait, Singapore and Thailand. The focus of the research was on brokered migration 
for domestic work and construction work because these two occupations are globally 
important for low-skilled migrants and offer important insights into the specificities of 
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recruitment and placement of workers. According to the ILO (Gallotti and Branch, 2015) and 
Building and Wood Workers International, a global federation of unions of building workers, 
domestic work and construction work together employ at least 240 million adults and an 
equally significant number of children worldwide (reliable statistics for child labour not 
available). Migrants from poor and historically disadvantaged social groups and regions are 
heavily represented in both occupations. Brokerage is widespread in these occupations as 
companies extend their reach to ever more remote locations in search of a docile workforce 
that will accept exploitative conditions. Both kinds of work have also been listed as 
occupations of concern in the context of efforts to abolish trafficking and slavery and the 
worst forms of child labour. Both countries have made serious efforts to eliminate informal 
brokers in an effort to reduce exploitation. We unpick the relations between private actors 
(brokers, employers), the state and its machinery and labour to throw light on the micro-
mechanisms that create unfree labour during the recruitment, journey, placement and 
employment of migrant workers. We also examine why systems of brokerage and unfree 
labour continue to exist despite efforts to eliminate them and provide a more nuanced picture 




The paper draws on evidence gathered through 15 months of research in Ghana and 
Myanmar, involving 215 indepth interviews with aspiring, current and returned migrants 
working as domestic or construction workers, formal and informal brokers as well as 
transport providers.  Interviewing a range of actors provided a variety of perspectives and 
insights into the infrastructure of brokerage and how different components of the system link 
up with each other in migration and recruitment systems. By doing so, points of vulnerability 
and exploitation as well as opportunities for exercising agency were identified. In Ghana, 
interviews were conducted in one urban area (Accra-Tema) and two rural locations (Nkoranza 
and Bawku). The Accra-Tema urban conglomeration is an important destination and transit 
point for migrants who are working to save money before they attempt an onward journey 
abroad.  Nkoranza in the Brong Ahafo region has emerged as a major location for migrants 
travelling north towards Libya. Due to the concentration of “connection men” as brokers are 
locally known, Nkoranza is also a point where deported migrants return and stay if they plan 
to migrate again. Fieldwork was also conducted in the Northeastern town of Bawku because it 
is an important point along the route for migrants heading up north towards Libya from the 
Brong Ahafo region and here there are other brokers to help them with their onward journey.  
 
In Myanmar the research was conducted in Yangon from where there is significant 
international migration towards richer countries in Southeast Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia 
and Singapore. Although there is a ban on migration for domestic work to Singapore because 
of reports of human rights abuses, the system of brokerage has found ways of circumventing 
that. However respondents were reluctant to discuss details of this migration so some 
interviews were conducted by phone with current migrants in Singapore identified through 
snowballing. Many of the migrants transiting through Yangon are originally from rural areas 
in Ayeyarwady and other deprived regions. Research was also conducted in Mon and Kayin 
states which account for large numbers of men and women migrating to Thailand. Decades of 
chronic under-development, conflict as well as the long border with Thailand has created 
opportunities for human smuggling and irregular migration in this region inhabited by the 
Karen, Pa-O and other ethnic groups. 
 
In order to examine the social construction of exploitative relations and unfree labour it is 
important to consider the terms of recruitment at origin, experiences en route, the insertion of 
migrants into labour markets at destination and the overall policy context which determines 
their legality, rights and protection. Particular routes and destinations that were commonly 
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encountered in the study areas are discussed to illustrate social relations and power dynamics 




In framing our argument we draw on three interconnected bodies of literature. First, we 
discuss key literature which examines the interaction of precarious employment, precarious 
legal status and unfree labour, including recent thinking on hyper-precarity as well as the 
political economy of unfree labour. These two bodies of work throw light on how the state 
creates and reproduces unfree labour and compounds precarity through border control, 
immigration and restricted employment policies. We then briefly discuss major works in the 
rapidly evolving field of migration industry and brokerage research which provide insights on 
the inner workings, motivations, interactions and outcomes of networks and assemblages of 
diverse actors that together facilitate and constrain mobility and agency. Finally we engage 
with the scholarship that analyses the forms and nature of individual agency in highly 
constrained circumstances that speak to the situation that we encountered in both of these 
countries.  
 
There is now a vast body of literature on worker precarity and unfree labour arising from the 
progressive dismantling of protective employment by economic liberalisation policies 
(Bourdieu, 1997; Standing, 2011). While early analyses were focused on capital-labour 
relations in the workplace, the debate has now moved on to recognise the role of actors 
beyond the workplace including the role of the state in co-creating precarity (Buckley, 
McPhee, and Rogaly 2017). Research on the geographies of precarity has shown that 
migrants are especially vulnerable to being employed in precarious work and unfree labour 
conditions (Basok et al.2015; Paret and Gleeson 2016; Platt et al. 2017; Strauss 2017). Their 
precarity arises not only through employment relations but also through the interaction of 
neoliberal labour markets and restrictive migration policies giving rise to what Lewis et al. 
(2015) call hyperprecarity (p 3). This can apply to even those who are on legal work permits 
as is the case in Singapore (Wee et al 2018) and the Gulf countries through the notorious 
Kafala system of labour recruitment (Deshingkar et al 2018). Those without legal status are 
even more vulnerable to becoming precarious and trapped in unfree labour. Menjivar and 
Kanstroom (2013) draw attention to the extreme vulnerability of undocumented migrants and 
those with precarious legal status to being deported. Intense surveillance and potential threats 
of removal create a situation of hyper-precarity that extends beyond the workplace. De 
Genova and Peutz (2010) see countries that allocate different legal statuses in the form of 
temporary work contracts and permits with strict rules of residence as ‘deportation regimes’, a 
feature of many migrant-receiving countries. This strand of work resonates with recent 
research on the political economy on unfree labour. Le Baron and Phillips (2017) critique 
existing analyses which focus on capital and labour without systematically analysing the role 
of the state in the production and reproduction of unfree labour through “causal and 
multifaceted roles in creating the conditions in which unfree labour can flourish” (p1). Like 
Lewis et al (2015), Menjivar and Kanstroom (2013) and De Genova and Peutz (2010), they 
train the spotlight on the interaction between labour market regulations, migration regulation 
and business regulation in shaping unfreedom among migrant labour. The added value of 
LeBaron and Phillip’s critique for our work is that it allows us to explain the multifaceted and 
often contradictory roles played by the state. While one aspect of it is to immobilise labour 
through immigration and employment policies, other dimensions of the interaction of the state 
with brokerage are through the rent seeking activities of officials at check-points and passport 
offices. There are now calls for states to take responsibility for their own involvement in the 
production of unfree labour and modern slavery. Webb and Garciandia (2018) distinguish 
between different modes of state involvement, including informal involvement through 
corruption and state sanctioned systems of brokerage and human trafficking, both of which 
we have ample evidence on from Ghana and Myanmar.  
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Exactly how precarious labour, precarious legal status and unfree labour are connected is now 
a matter of intense debate. Strauss and McGrath (2017) call for a conceptualisation of the 
unfreedom experienced by migrants along a continuum of labour relations that highlight the 
interrelationship between restrictive immigration regimes and unequal power relations in 
labour markets. In a similar vein, Anderson and O’Connell Davidson (2003) urge us to view 
people’s experience as a continuum of exploitation, abuse, powerlessness and restriction 
rather than a black and white situation of exploited or free. Lerche (2007) takes a similar 
position in his essay on free and unfree labour which he conceptualises as a continuum rather 
than two polar opposites.  
 
But the role of migration intermediaries namely brokers and the wider migration industry in 
shaping unfree labour remains under-researched. However there has been considerable 
interest in migration brokerage and its various forms including smuggling to better understand 
why and how these intermediaries have emerged and how they operate. While early 
scholarship focused on brokerage as a business and brokers themselves as the main actors in 
migration mediation (Salt and Stein xx) recent scholarship has broadened the understanding 
to include a variety of actors including individual entrepreneurs large corporations, secular 
and faith based NGOs to organized criminal networks involved in human trafficking who are 
involved in the business of migration or  “migration industry” (Hernandez Leon, 2005; 
Gammeltoft and Sorensen, 2013).  
 
The reasons for the emergence of brokerage networks are extremely context specific, shaped 
by the interaction of the state, labour markets and private actors. Research in different 
countries has revealed these specificities: for example in wealthy migrant receiving countries 
in Southeast Asia brokers have emerged to assist migrants with the navigation of complex 
immigration regimes (Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 2012; McKeown2012;). In countries of 
origin brokers have also emerged because of the inaccessibility of the state and its formal 
procedures but also to assist remote rural communities who have limited knowledge of 
transport routes and networks (Lindquist 2012). Research in northern Thailand conducted by 
Sobieszczyk (2002) found that informal brokers are often chosen because the entire process 
of obtaining papers, travelling and finding work is much faster than migrating through legal 
channels (p. 5). The same was seen in northern Ghana where brokers were preferred over 
legal channels (Lucht, 2013). Brokers are also present in labour source areas from where 
industries seek to recruit workers who are prepared to accept exploitative conditions 
(Guérin2013; McCollum and Findlay 2018, Tyner 2004). Different brokers are present in 
transit locations who assist with temporary sojourns and finding work, onward journeys , 
communication with families and the transfer of funds (Ayelew et al 2018).  
 
The economic and social relations between different components and tiers of the migration 
industry has been identified as an area requiring further inquiry (Faist 2014). Xiang and 
Lindquist (2014) use the analogy of flying which involves multiple structures, networks, 
institutions and technology in their analysis of the “infrastructure” of migration or 
systematically linked institutions, actors and technologies that condition and facilitate 
migration. They stress this collective interaction ‘it is not migrants who migrate but rather 
constellations consisting of migrants and non-migrants, of human and non-human actors. This 
is increasingly obvious today, as more than ever before, migration is intensively mediated.’ 
(S124) Understanding the logic of these components of the migration infrastructure and how 
they collide and become entangled with each other is key to understanding the specificities of 
migration mediation in different contexts. Schapendonk (2017) interrogates the different 
actors and their roles, drawing on the concept of assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) to 
argue that they can be in conflict but also overlap, blurring the boundaries between them.  
Indeed as the findings presented here show, brokers and other actors involved in migration in 
Ghana and Myanmar appear to respond in these complex and overlapping ways. 
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With the growing complexity of brokerage networks that has gone hand in hand with 
tightening restrictions on mobility, there has also been a sharp increase in the cost of 
migration. Those wishing to migrate to Europe from Ghana are paying anywhere between 
eight and ten thousand dollars. Myanmar migrants travelling to Singapore can also end up 
paying thousands of dollars (Goh et al, 2015). 
 
In policy debates, the rising costs and the proliferation of brokers have been taken as 
indicators of a ruthless profit-making business where exploitation and extraction of cheap 
labour overrides any altruistic motivations. Ethnographic research on brokers problematizes 
this. For example, extended immersive research by Osella (2014) and Osella and Osella 
(2009) among migrant communities in Kerala discusses the reasons for migrants placing their 
trust in brokers. For them, brokers are more credible and hold the promise of fulfilling their 
migration project which is to be delivered in the Gulf. Whether or not they are regarded as 
illegitimate by the state, is not of concern to the migrants. Similar findings have emerged 
from the research by Alpes (2013) in Cameroun.  
 
Complicating the picture is evidence that brokers are integral to migrants being able to 
exercise agency – by transcending local power inequalities, by accessing more remunerative 
work and by switching jobs at destination (Deshingkar 2018; Deshingkar et al 2018; 
Awumbila et al 2018; Wee et al 2018 and Picherit 2018). In other words migrants are 
exercising agency in highly constrained situations and brokers are a key part of their 
strategies for self-development as we discuss next.  
 
Agency in brokerage relations 
 
Migrant agency in contemporary forms of mobility has been extensively researched (Castles 
2002; Goldring and Landolt 2011; Rogaly and Thieme 2012), but the ways in which brokers 
help migrants extend their agency remains poorly understood. Efforts to classify agency in 
terms of its transformative effects on structures of inequality have distinguished between 
small acts of resilience and resistance which may provide ways of coping with oppression and 
some improvements in working conditions, and on the other hand, those that can rework 
power relations (Katz 2004). The few studies that have unpicked the specificities of migrant 
agency within brokerage which cover various possibilities described by Katz and distinguish 
between a) the extension of migrant agency by brokers wherein they assist migrants in 
transgressing local socio-economic boundaries by moving away and b) the potential for 
brokerage to offer opportunities for resistance against unequal power relations at destination 
and a shift in subject positions over time. The first is relatively better researched in relation to 
migration (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen 2013; Cranston, Schapendonk, and Spaan 
2018) as well as migrant smuggling (Van Liempt and Doomernik 2006; Van Liempt 2007; 
Zhang, Sanchez, and Achilli 2018). Van Liempt and Doomernik’s (2006) research on 
migrants smuggled into The Netherlands from Iraq, the Horn of Africa and the erstwhile 
Soviet Union challenges the idea that migrants have no agency in the process of smuggling. 
They highlight the varying degrees of autonomy that migrants have in deciding where and 
how they want to travel but stress that they ultimately remain vulnerable to exploitation.  
 
There is a smaller and evolving field of work on brokerage itself being part of migrants’ 
agential strategies. These examine the different ways in which brokers assist migrants with 
performing ideal migrant roles, integration at destination, bargaining with potential employers 
and switching jobs. Wee et al. (2018) unpack broker practices in recruiting and placing 
domestic workers in Singapore to show how brokers create vulnerability and precarity 
through ‘chutes’ that the migrants can fall into, but also possess the power to patch up these 
chutes and set migrants on to ladders of upward social mobility. The authors discuss the issue 
of the discretionary weekly day off for migrant workers in Singapore which has been left to 
negotiations between workers and employers. Agents may open chutes by hiring only those 
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workers who are willing to give up their days off. The uncertainty of the route for migrants is 
created by opening and closing of chutes and distributing precarity between the different parts 
of the migration industry. In Ghana, urban brokers are a critical source of material support for 
newly arrived rural girls and women in the city (Awumbila et al. 2018). Thus brokers play 
complex and contradictory roles: they are part of the system that reproduces precarious and 
unfree labour but at the same time, they also help with opportunities for exploring the job 
market in Accra where guarantors and character references are needed. Brokers also assist 
migrants with switching jobs and moving up the job ladder but whether or not they do so 
depends on how they evaluate the migrants’ attributes and character and the strategies that the 
migrants themselves employ to convince the brokers to act on their behalf. These findings 
chime with the research being presented here for Myanmar migrants in Singapore and 
Thailand.  
 
Implicit in some of the scholarship on migrant agency and brokerage are aspects related to 
time. This is because agency in highly constrained situations can transform the social and 
economic position of migrants and their families gradually, over an extended period of time. 
While the importance of considering temporalities in the analysis of migration has been 
stressed in a number of studies, it has taken varied positions. Researchers including  Rogaly 
and Thieme (2012) and Robertson (2014) highlight non-linear and complex journeys with 
varied durations, stages and hazy boundaries between temporary and permanent migration 
others have tried to conceptualise the spatio-temporal reorderings and transformations that 
migrants experience through an analysis of migration dynamics in the past, present and 
future, drawing on life-course theories (Hopkins and Pain 2007; Bailey 2009; Kobayashi and 
Preston 2014). Only a handful of studies explicitly analyse the temporality of migrant agency. 
Among these are Bastia and McGrath (2011) as well as O’Connell Davidson (2013) who 
argue that crippling debts and unfree working conditions in the present may be suffered to 
gain freedoms in the future. In other words migrants are “mortgaging” the present to reap 
benefits in the future (Bastia and McGrath 2011). Perhaps this is why nearly all the all the 
situations that are described as slavery in modern societies today involve people voluntarily 
and actively seeking out those opportunities as Brace and O’Connell Davidson (2018) 
observe in their recent volume on slavery. Recent studies by Deshingkar et al (2018) on the 
migration of Bangladeshi construction workers to Qatar and Johnson (2018) on the migration 
of domestic workers to the Middle East also find that the discourse on force and unfree labour 
fails to recognise opportunities for agency that may arise, albeit in heavily constrained 
conditions. The concept of “constrained agency” proposed by Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) 
and applied by Carswell and De Neve (2018) among others, is also useful here. These 
scholars analyse the gendered subject positions of workers in migrant labour markets and 
examine their agency against their social and economic background. The entry into debt-
migration by migrants from Myanmar from extremely poor families who agree to forgo 
months of wages can be understood when compared with the extremely limited options back 
home which may be considered worse.  
 
 
The infrastructure of migration and migration journeys  
 
Community discourses in the research locations suggest that the prevalence of informal 
brokers has mushroomed over the last ten years. Informal brokers known as “Connection 
men” in Ghana and “Carry” in Myanmar work with transport agents, immigration and border 
officials as well as national identity and passport authorities. In both countries the first move 
was often made by the migrant or migrant’s friends or family in finding a broker with a 
reputation for delivering migrants to a particular destination or job. The first act of the broker 
is usually to discourage the migrant from doing anything themselves once they have decided 
to go with the broker and thus to surrender to choices made for them by the broker. In the 
case of persons intending to migrate irregularly to North Africa from Ghana, brokers were 
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largely responsible for acquiring passports and organising the entire trip through the desert. In 
the case of migration to the Gulf States from Ghana, the brokers were largely responsible for 
identifying vacancies, acquiring visas and providing training for the potential migrants. A 
similar pattern was seen in Myanmar where brokers arranged the journey for migrant 
construction workers whereas their involvement in the migration of women for domestic 
work was greater and more controlling. As in Ghana, they identified jobs, procured visas, 
provided training and places to stay enroute.  In this way, informal brokers play a critical role 
in selecting and filtering workers who can be placed in exploitative work. Brokers source 
girls and women who are docile, poorly informed about migration and the labour market at 
destination, who come from deprived backgrounds and are more likely to accept forced 
labour conditions (Tyner, 2004). They collude with employers who are sanctioned by 
receiving country governments to employ migrant workers under debt-bondage conditions to 
limit their spatial mobility and extract cheap labour. The functioning of brokers in this type of 
channelling and placement has been documented in extensive research in other parts of Asia 
(Rodriguez and Schwenken, 2013). What was also striking about brokers’ roles in migration 
for domestic work was that they were also involved in the choice of destination country 
indicating that they channelled workers into places where their own networks extended. As 
Nyunt, a return migrant from Singapore who was interviewed in Yangon said: 
 
“They told me that Singapore is better and safer. I didn’t have any money with me and my 
family didn’t know about this. They said that I will have to pay for the medical check-up and 
the agent will pay for other things. So, I was happy. They gave me contact numbers, an 
address card and e-mail addresses for both Myanmar and Singapore companies so that I can 
contact them if I get into trouble”. 
 
The broker will try to reassure the migrant that they always fulfil their promise and may 
mobilise others who have migrated through them to build up their case:  
 
 “You know after listening to the agent and those ladies over there, I was convinced that it 
was the right thing to do. The agent made me talk [on phone] to some ladies who were 
already there. They all said positive things about the work there, but never told me the work 
was that tedious” (Alex-Return Migrant-Nkoranzah) 
 
However, a majority who use the services of brokers are given incomplete or false 
information about the journey as well as the jobs they are going into and the terms of their 
employment and living. Brokers at origin are often part of chains of brokers along the route 
and all the way to the destination. While village level brokers may claim no knowledge of 
exploitative practices further up the chain, once the migrants are in their control, they are at 
the start of a process that places them on an exploitative trajectory.  
 
It was also common for brokers to declare the total amount they would charge to deliver the 
migrant to an agreed point. While potential migrants were usually expected to pay upfront, it 
was also seen in both Myanmar and Ghana that some were offered more flexible 
arrangements. These arrangements are either when a “sponsor” at the other end, either a 
relative or friend, promises to pay the broker after the migrant is delivered safely or as in 
Nyunt’s case when the broker pays all the transport charges, work permit charges and any 
other costs together with the employer and recuperates them through salary deductions.  
Once at destination, workers are often prevented from leaving by confinement, threats of 
violence and confiscation of documents as the experience of domestic workers shows. At the 
same time the accounts also indicate that there is a need to better understand how migrants 
agency is being exercised in such extreme situations of exploitation.  
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Ghana to Libya for construction work 
 
Libya is, by all accounts, a failed state where the lack of a clear government and labour 
protection has created a situation of lawlessness4. There appears to be no legislative and 
administrative framework for managing migration and smuggling that adheres to international 
frameworks. Armed militia roam the streets and shoot and rob people at random. Despite this, 
Libya is a favoured destination because of the remunerative work opportunities as well as 
opportunities for onward travel to Europe, as highlighted  in the statement below by an 
aspiring migrant:   
 
“I wanted to travel to Europe to hustle and make money to help my family. You know in 
Ghana there is no job and things are hard, even when you go to university and finish it is 
difficult to get a job. I have friends who have passed through Libya and are now in 
Europe so I was in close contact with them so they keep telling how good it is come to 
Europe” Sam-Current Migrant  in Libya 
 
Kevin said he went there to work to save money to go to Europe but was content to be in 
Libya even though he did not make it to Europe. 
 
“I knew I didn’t have money to go to Italy or Spain. But I knew when I get to Libya things will 
be okay” (Kevin-Return Migrant-Nkoranzah)  
 
An aspiring migrant, Bob, said he was also planning to go to Europe via Libya: 
 
“I want to migrate to Germany yeah but I will use it through Libya to Italy and then seek 
asylum then to Germany because a lot of my friends are over there. Because I learnt over 
jobs are earning the workmanship is good you understand”. Bob Aspiring Migrant in 
Bawku 
 
As shown in the statements above, these migrants are inspired by cases like Mustafa, a 
current migrant in Germany, who had worked in Libya for several years before travelling to 
Germany.  
Migration via the desert, remigration 
 
Some migrants had been deported and had remigrated through extremely dangerous routes 
multiple times. Given the situation in Libya this was surprising but the risks and routes of 
irregular migration were well known in Nkoranzah and Bawku. Kevin, a migrant from 
Nkoranzah described his reasons and experiences of repeat migration to Libya three times via 
Bawku, Niamey and Agadez, paying connection-men and border officials (not clear what 
kind and whether actually official) at each stage. The connection-men in the transit towns 
were well-known in Nkoranzah and he had their names before he left. His friends had 
prepared him for the journey: he had taken gari to avoid starvation, glucose for energy during 
rough journeys on foot as well as West Africa CFA Francs to pay at different borders.  
 
I met four connection men. Bawku, Niamey, Agadez, and then the one in Libya. When you 
meet them, you will pay them. Then they will get you some place to sleep and find a vehicle 
for the continuation of the journey. Then they will also get you some food (Kevin-Return 
Migrant-Nkoranzah). 
 
He appeared to view the relationship with the connection men as reciprocal and supportive 
rather than one of control and subjugation. The broker’s responsibility ended just before the 
                                                        
4 Ware, R. (2018) Libya: the consequences of a failed state. House of Commons briefing paper. CBP 
8314. 
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Libyan border and they instructed the migrants to manage by themselves. That last leg of the 
journey was the riskiest as they had to walk through territory with armed gangs who rob 
migrants with impunity. Those without money are handed over to the Libyan police. It was 
not clear whether these were actual police as it was entirely possible for imposters to engage 
in such extortion in a situation of complete lawlessness.   
 
We went through Hoggar5, We had to walk. We spent two weeks and four days at Hoggar. We 
were living on the mountain, there were no houses at that place so we slept on the stones.  We 
met armed robbers. They will make you to undress and kneel down. They will take all your 
money. I was told it was a scary journey and truly, It was very scary. You will meet dead 
bodies on the desert, and even at Hoggar you can easily be killed by the armed robbers. I saw 
dead bodies, I even collapsed at Hoggar.  
 
Because we did not have money, we were imprisoned. The Libya police arrested us and 
imprisoned us for four months, all this while you will not bath. You are given water once a 
day to drink which is even salty. We were from different countries in the cell. We were many. 
Each room had about 100 people. Both male and female. We were many. We had to call home 
and ask for money to bail us. So when the money came I used that to pay the police before I 
was released. I had to call a brother of mine who is a fitter in Ghana to send me the money.  
 
This pattern of extortion from migrant families has been widely reported in the media and 
recent research as well (Van Reisen and Rijken, 2015). He gradually made his way to Tripoli 
via Saba, stopping and working along the way. Once in Tripoli, he was quickly put to work 
by the connection-man there. He started earning 1500 GHC6 a month and began sending 
remittances immediately.  
 
So my first savings I sent it my mother to build the house. And my brother who was a mason I 
helped to join me. Then my siblings had completed senior secondary school so I sent money 
for them to go to training college. 
 
But one of the employers betrayed him to the police and he was arrested once again and 
deported back to Ghana after a month. Despite these events, Kevin decided to try his luck 
again a year later with financial support from his family. He regards his migration as a 
success for the family.  
 
Now I have siblings in Italy and the other brother is in Libya. Some are teaching and some 
are in school. I didn’t get everything, but by the grace of God I have been able to put up a 
house which was part of my main aim for traveling so I’m satisfied. 
 
Kevin and others like him are placed on trajectories into extremely precarious and uncertain 
journeys not knowing when they will be caught, imprisoned, robbed or deported. Even those 
who had successfully remained in Libya were working under conditions that can only be 
described as unfree labour.  
 
Although aiming to ban informal brokers, the Ghanaian state has no mechanism for managing 
or regulating informal brokers. While government is no doubt aware of the operations of 
connection men, its main response has been to criminalise them without introducing realistic 
ways of regulating them to reduce migrant vulnerability. On the other hand, the complete 
breakdown of the state in Libya and the outsourcing of European border controls by 
bolstering the deportation system without protecting migrant rights has left migrants from 
                                                        
5 A large plateau in the north centre of the Sahara, encompassing the Tibesti area of Libya. An old 
caravan route passed through this region 
6 The exchange rate was roughly 5 cedis to the US Dollar 
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Mon to Thailand for Construction work 
 
The context of migration for construction work is altogether different in Myanmar. Compared 
to Ghana, migrants from the conflict ridden, poor state of Mon towards neighbouring 
Thailand for construction work were far less educated and much younger. Most of our 
interviewees came from extremely poor families where both men and women were migrating 
for construction work and most were 4th or 5th standard educated and not in regular work 
before they migrated. Thailand has recently introduced several measures to curb irregular 
migration and limits the rights of migrants in the country. It places restrictions on the right to 
travel, or change employers, and through the Thai Labour Relations Act, prevents non-Thais 
from forming unions. However as the cases below show, brokers and the state machinery are 
deeply involved in maintaining irregular migration and unfree labour. 
 
Due to long standing political and economic instability, Mon youth see migration as a rite of 
passage and the only way of achieving a transformation in their economic conditions through 
the purchase of land, building/renovating houses or starting a business. Female migrants 
working in construction often come from extremely poor families where there are no older 
male siblings to migrate and support the family, as in the case of Simi. She is the eldest 
daughter in a poor family with three younger brothers. She decided to migrate to build a 
future for her son and support her parents.  
 
For my child. For his development, prosperity, to be educated, to be able to attend school. I 
have to support my child. I have seen other people going and I wanted to go. I have seen 
other people sent money to their parents, so I wanted to look after my parents. That’s why I 
came. 
 
A majority migrate through known brokers and feel better protected through them, as narrated 
below by a current migrant:   
 
That time, people had to go illegally. So, it will be safer to go with broker. Besides, I couldn’t 
speak Thai, it was better to go with broker. Simi, current migrant border town near Malaysia. 
 
If I come by myself with car it is difficult. As I was alone I could be left. If by the broker it was 
with other people so it was easier. It cost 1500 Baht7 more but I wouldn’t face trouble. So I 
came with broker although it cost more. Myint, current migrant Phuket 
 
When we had to pass the Thai police gate, he (broker) just met them (border police) himself. 
We didn’t even go out from the car (Mary, current migrant Phuket) 
Costs 
On average, migrants from Mon paid 30,000 Kyat8 to brokers to cross the border to Thailand 
and then another 1200 Baht for onward journeys. These costs were usually financed through 
borrowing from relatives. Nearly all crossed the border illegally without any documents but 
then regularised their status after a period of time borrowing money from employers and 
obtaining documents through brokers. They either migrate to a known job or find work 
immediately and switch jobs easily sometimes with the next boss releasing them from debt or 
easing their hardship by offering advance payments. The usual patterns is for them to obtain 
                                                        
7 Roughly 30 THB to the USD 
8 The exchange rate was roughly 1000 Kyat to the US Dollar. 
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official permits after they have repaid their initial debts and after there is trust built up with 
the boss. The boss then lends them the 8500 Baht needed for the “Thai Passport” and this is 
recuperated through wage deductions but on flexible terms that suit the worker, taking into 
account his/her needs.   
 
Irregular status risks, advantages 
 
The irregular status of migrants means that they are extremely vulnerable to being cheated. 
Cases of no pay were common and there is no legal recourse.  
 
What could I do? I didn’t have any passport and I couldn’t speak Thai. So I couldn’t do 
anything about it, except move to another place. Mary, current migrant. 
 
All through her migration, Mary had no contact with the Thai authorities at all which was 
typical of migrants in her situation.  
 
I had to give 500 baht every month. I gave the boss and he gave the police man. He just said 
that for the worker who doesn't have passport there is a tax to the police of 500 baht a month 
to get the permission to live and work their country. So we have to do it. If a worker was 
caught without documents, the boss released them. 
 
From Mary’s perspective, bosses like hers were “good” because they got her to her 
destination and protected her against the law there. Brokers and bosses operating below the 
law were crucial to the migration project of many of the migrants we interviewed as they 
wanted to remain irregular as they did not have limits on the time period of stay and work in 
the informal economy where there were possibilities for changing employers. 
 
Migrants use a variety of strategies to overstay in Thailand which often involve brokers who 
have contacts with border officials. One such method is the ghost stamping of passports.   
Nyein is a Mon Buddhist who started migrating to Thailand to work in construction where 
many of her relatives were already working. She has managed to stay there through the illegal 
system of passport stamping where the broker carries the passport while she remains in 
Thailand.  
 
From this route they stamped the seal on the passport. So even if I didn’t want to go back 
within 1 year I can stay here (in Thailand).  
 
Once the debts incurred by the family to finance migration as well as the debts to the 
employer for obtaining passports and permits have been repaid, migrants can start to save and 
remit in substantial amounts as was the case with Mimi who had been remitting between 
100,000 and 150,000 Kyat to her mother and is saving the rest to buy more gold.  
 
Migration for Domestic Work 
 
Debt-migration was highly prevalent in this kind of migration, either because women 9 
entering such migration belonged to very poor families or because they had decided to leave 
without the backing of their families and did not have enough savings to pay upfront.  The 
Gulf States are notorious for the “Kafala” system of labour recruitment which ties workers to 
Kafeels or sponsors of their visa and work permits. The Kafala system, which ties migrants to 
a single employer and gives hardly any rights to challenge working conditions (Fernandez, 
                                                        
9 Globally, domestic work is female dominated because work within homes is typically regarded 
as “women’s work”. 
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2013), has been held responsible for the widespread abuse of workers’ rights in the Gulf 
States. Although reforms to the Kafala system were introduced in 2016, domestic work was 
not brought under the new structure leaving workers vulnerable to neo-slavery (Parrenas and 
Silvey 2016). Employers are still bestowed with extensive powers of control including not 
granting release to an employee and limits on mobility. Migrants such as her are prime 
candidates for brokers to channel into “state-sponsored bonded labour” arrangements that 
Franz (2013) speaks of in her essay on domestic workers in Jordan. State regulations in 
Singapore have also created the conditions for extreme labour exploitation and a migrant 
workforce few civil liberties and rights. Singaporean has a two tier system for skilled and 
unskilled migrant workers (Baey and Yeoh, 2018). The regime has been criticised for creating 
hyperprecarious conditions by allowing employers and the state to collude over punitive debt 
bondage arrangements (Platt et al, 2017) as well as the regulation of the residence and 
reproductive rights of migrants (Huang and Yeoh 1998). The power to create worker precarity 
and vulnerability is in the hands of employers and brokers who place them and it is up to 
them whether they choose to worsen or mitigate these risks and hardships (Wee et al 2018). 
Until recently, workers were not entitled to any days off and although legislation has been 
introduced to encourage this, it is still left to the discretion of employers. Thailand places 
restrictions on the right to travel, or change employers, and through the Thai Labour Relations 
Act prevents non-Thais from forming unions.  Women employed in domestic work are 
excluded from the 1998 Thai Labour Protection Act (Carden 2014). 
 
Both countries have banned certain kinds of labour migration: the government of Ghana 
banned labour migration to the Middle East in 2017 and Myanmar has an ongoing ban on 
migration for domestic work to Singapore. Despite this, such migration continues but it has 
been pushed underground and occurs through informal brokers and irregular routes. In Ghana, 
brokers often take longer routes through neighbouring countries rather than flying directly to 
the Gulf States to avoid detection. The costs of migration for domestic work has increased in 
both countries in the context of migration bans. Brokers have to pay for transport, bribes 
along the way and in some instances work permits (the costs for these could be shared by the 
employer). Such migration in both countries was highly structured and heavily controlled by 
brokers from the moment the women left the house. Control was exercised through 
restrictions on spaces of travel, transit, living and working, the confiscation of passports and 
phones. The heavy control is most likely because brokers and employers must ensure that 
their advances are repaid. Below we discuss some specificities of broker practices in Kayin, 
Yangon and Ghana. 
Kayin to Thailand for Domestic Work 
Kayin is known for the migration of domestic workers to Thailand and this pattern has 
resulted from social networks and established migration streams. As was seen in the case of 
Mon construction workers, the prevalence of informal brokers was widespread.  
 
31 year old Hla is a typical migrant domestic worker from the region. She comes from a 
subsistence farming family in a village near Hpa-An in Kayin and had migrated to Thailand 
three times since 2007. She decided to migrate after failing her 10th exam twice as she saw no 
future in the village. Her cousin put her in touch with an informal broker in the village who 
was  recruiting for domestic work in Bangkok. She borrowed from her aunt to pay 500,000 
Kyat for the entire package which included all the necessary documentation and a safe 
crossing.  
 
The journeys of female domestic workers were far more hazardous than construction 
workers.Although none of the respondents reported sexual harassment or abuse by the 
brokers, they experienced deception, physical confinement with one saying she was drugged 
by the broker so that she could be smuggled across in a container. 
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Hla was taken to Thailand in a group of 28 who were also being smuggled via Meh Tha Waw 
and described how the journey was not at all what she had expected. We were packed into the 
car. I was very afraid, I couldn’t control my tears. I was afraid and I missed my parents. We 
had to sleep in the forest. We had to hide. It was raining and mosquitoes bit us. The food was 
not good, the water was unclean. We were kept in a cage. The car was covered with 
Tarpaulin and 28 people were packed. All male, female, were kept together. 
 
The 500 km journey to Bangkok took ten days with several stops and hideouts along the way. 
Hla caught cerebral malaria and nearly died.  
 
Her subsequent trips were with a variety of Carrys – the second time the Carry was a Thai 
policeman but the subsequent trip through Myawaddy was another kind of Carry who 
administered a drug to put her to sleep through the journey.  
 
She (Carry) gave me a sedation drug. I thought I was dead. When I regained consciousness 
she had sent me to Kyar wah Tar. We had to sit in a row and dared not make a noise. There 
was no light. It was dark. We had to stay like that. They gave us a small amount of rice and 
half of boiled egg. We were all distressed.  
 
Similar stories of extremely hazardous journeys organised by brokers emerged in the other 
interviews. Htet reported how she was hidden in a secret compartment at the back of a duck 
enclosure in Myawaddy. Others described being transported in compartments at the bottom of 
trucks full of vegetables and feeling terrified when the border guards thrust spears through 
them to detect people. 
 
Working conditions at destination  
Not being having formal or legal contracts that specify the conditions of work or migrant 
rights was the norm and this created room for deception and cheating. When Hla arrived in 
Bangkok the job turned out to be less than she had expected. 
 
During the interview they said that I will have to work 8 hours a day. When I went to work, 
the work didn’t finish from morning 5 AM to 7 PM. And then they told me that they will give 
me 10000 baht. When I arrived there, she gave me only 8000. There are many bosses who are 
not good. They didn’t allow me when I asked permission to go out. If I go out they accused me 
of sneaking out. Recently, I have asked the boss for resignation, but she didn’t give me.  
 
Other research by Kyoko Kusakabe and Ruth Pearson (2010) on Myanmar women in 
Thailand also highlights their precarity and vulnerability. Despite her experiences, Hla re-
migrated twice through informal brokers because she wanted to re-enter the informal labour 
market without being restricted to one job. 
Strategies to remain in Thailand 
Here too migrants were using brokers who had contacts with border officials to enable them 
to stay in Thailand illegally. Another domestic worker from Kayin (Cho) spoke of the system 
of passport stamping where Carry and drivers would take the passports of Myanmar citizens 
to have them stamped at a certain “gate” in Mae Sot. For 5000 THB they obtain stamps 
showing that the migrant had returned but in fact she had stayed illegally in the country all 
through.  
 
The first seal (stamp in the passport) was for coming back to the village. This seal was for 
entering Thai. This is for re-entry seal. For the seal, the broker did it. (return). They have to 
do the seal for the return. The broker did it. Yes, there is a gate at Mae Sot. 
 
Hla described a similar process 
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They took the passport from Burmese who came back from Myanmar. They took the picture 
that was similar to me. They gave the police money at every step and at the gates. I didn’t 
need to be afraid. I didn’t need to hide. I could come freely. When we have a similar face, we 
can hold the passport and come. We had to tell the name in the passport. But the police didn’t 
ask me. They (Carry) have already given the money to the police. There were 5 gates from 
Mae Sot to Bangkok.  
 
Htet paid on average 500,000 Kyat each time she travelled in this way. In the 2 years that she 
had stayed there, she changed jobs three times because of issues related to non-payment of 
wages, accusations of sneaking out and not being treated well when she was unwell. Through 
local Carrys she was able to find different jobs and at the time of the interview she intended to 
stay in Bangkok until she finishes building her house at home. 
 
The complicity of border officials in the process is evident. On the one hand the state is 
positioning itself as the sole legitimate facilitator of migration and protector of human rights. 
But its officials play a dual role as they are embedded in the system of irregular migration and 
the rents that it brings.  
Ghana to The Middle East for Domestic Work 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait are the most popular destinations of Ghanaian 
labour in the Middle East. Most of the women who travelled for domestic work in the region 
were recruited by private recruitment agencies and connection men. Abi is a 27 year old 
Ghanaian migrant who had returned from Kuwait after a four year stint from 2009 to 2013. 
She decided to migrate because of her parent’s failing business and their inability to provide 
for five children. Her original desire was to migrate to Canada and she found a broker through 
a connection of her aunt’s. The broker verbally promised to send her to Canada for GHC 
4500 and told her she would earn 1500 GHC a month and have a day off every week. But just 
three days before departure he told her she was travelling to Kuwait, by which time she was 
trapped in the arrangement.  
 
With 3 or 4 days for me to move that was when they called us again to come to Accra and we 
came. They gave us some paper and I realized that no, this is not where they said I am going 
to.  So that day I was really angry and I didn’t want to go but they were like they have already 
spent the money. So what I thought was that, it means even if I should be around the following 
year I can’t go to school because I had already spent the money and the little that my mum 
and dad is already added so I have no other option than to go 
 
This kind of deception was mentioned in other interviews as well and migrants have no legal 
recourse against them. Although the Ghanaian government has taken extra measures to crack 
down on unscrupulous brokers, they continue to operate because they represent the only real 
hope for migrants with low levels of education gaining entry to countries in the developed 
world.  
Informal contracts and extractive work at destination 
As in the case of Kayin migrants, working conditions at the Gulf States were highly 
exploitative and migrants often found themselves being deceived with little recourse to legal 
complaint mechanisms. The conditions of work at the destination were different from what 
brokers in Ghana had verbally promised the migrants. The “paper” Abi signed just before 
departure from Ghana demanded that she pay the broker another 1500 GHC after she reached 
Kuwait. It did not mention wages or working conditions. Just before boarding her phone was 
also taken from her creating further feelings of isolation and anxiety. After a 12 hour wait at 
Kuwait airport with no information, she was eventually taken to her new employer. There she 
was expected to do all the washing and cleaning, starting at 7 in the morning and finishing at 
10 every night. There were no days off as verbally promised and she was paid a third of what 
she had expected. She was not allowed to go out and was allowed to call home only after four 
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months. Han, a 26 year old Ghanaian lady who has since 2014 been working in Saudi Arabia 
as domestic worker reported similar exploitation by her employers.  
 
Brokers for switching jobs 
Although many of the female domestic workers in the Middle East reported that it is very 
difficult to switch jobs because of the Kafala system which tends to tie migrants to a single 
employer, some of the domestic workers reported that they switched jobs with the help of 
brokers. For instance, after a year of miserable working conditions Abi told her employer she 
would not stay and he returned her to the broker’s office. There she met other brokers who 
promised to find her work “outside”. Outside was a way of referring to working outside the 
contract system.  
 
When I went to the (broker’s) office I met some friends who gave me some contacts for 
working outside. That was how I got connected to some people and later on they gave me 
help. Some are Ghanaians so they gave me their numbers and a taxi driver’s number,  
 
Abi was effectively challenging state-enforced immobility. During her four years in Kuwait 
Abi changed jobs at least four times through such informal agents. Similarly, Han and Har, 
who were Ghanaian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia reported that they managed to change 
employers, with the help of brokers. The domestic workers reported that while the general 
conditions of work in the Gulf States were bad, they were able to save some money. For 
instance, while Abi  described problems with all of the jobs such as being overworked or 
having sore hands from hand-washing clothes, she said she had managed to remit and save 
10,000 GHC for herself as well as spend money on renovating her grandmother’s house, 
paying for her younger brother’s school fees and her mother’s needs. At the time of the 
interview she was thinking of either attempting a journey to Germany or opening an import 
business in Ghana.  
 
Myanmar to Singapore for domestic work 
 
The situation of Myanmar domestic workers in Singapore was by far the worst, in terms of 
confinement, isolation and forced labour extraction. The interviews show varied arrangements 
– some along the lines prescribed by MOM (Ministry of Manpower, Singapore) where 
workers are placed by formally registered agencies after the necessary health checks have 
been conducted and work permits have been obtained., others with a degree of irregularity in 
the implementation of the arrangement and some that were completely outside the legal 
system. As was the case in Ghana, many of the domestic workers who took the decision to 
migrate because of economic problems relied on brokers who exploited them but also helped 
them realised their dreams. For instance, Phyu, had decided to migrate to Singapore because 
her alcoholic husband had run up heavy debts and she had no way of supporting her three 
children. She found a female agent in Yangon who promised to take her on a standard debt-
migration contract. She mentioned signing a contract in English and not being given a copy. 
She was also not allowed a phone and made to work in two houses instead of one on the same 
contract. But the job allowed her to extricate herself from debt in Myanmar.   
 
The case of Nyunt also demonstrates exploitation and agency of domestic workers from 
Myanmar. She migrated from Yangon to Singapore in 2008 because she wanted to work 
abroad to support her parents back in the village and educate her brother.  Although she, like 
many others in our study left without telling their families, her agency needs to be seen as 
relationally constituted rather than an autonomous decision because it was shaped by the 
needs of her family and the duty expected of daughters in Myanmar. She found a broker 
through her uncle’s wife and was taken to a fancy looking office in Yangon where they 
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explained how the agent would pay for everything. They made her sit for the MOM test and 
gave her an offer letter which she later realised were fake.  
 
She was made aware of monthly deductions to pay off the agent but was confused about how 
much she would earn. She did not challenge them as the contact was through her uncle and in 
Myanmar culture that would have seemed rude. After arrival she was taken to a facility that 
was clearly operating outside Singaporean law as she and other girls from Myanmar were 
locked inside while the agents found prospective employers. She was eventually selected by a 
Chinese employer who imposed extremely harsh working conditions and restrictions on her. 
Her work day started at 4am and she was locked in to her room at night. She was told that the 
employer would keep all of her wages for ten months. 
 
She said that I will get 60 dollars per month and she will save that money for me and she will 
give it back when I go back. She asked me how long am I going to get that 60 dollar per 
salary and I told her that it would be for a year. She said she is going to cut 10 months out of 
12 months from the salary. So, when 10 months’ salary is cut out of 12 months I will get only 
120 dollar working for a year.  
 
The employer began to cut further amounts from her salary for the smallest things including 
postage stamps and telephone calls home. After suffering mental trauma and self harming, the 
employer returned her to the agent in Singapore who promised to find her another job. But 
once again she was placed in an extremely exploitative situation. She eventually managed to 
escape to a police station from where she was sent home to Myanmar. Although her actions 
which led to her change of employers and escape can be interpreted as agency in extremely 
constrained circumstances, the outcome for her was not emancipatory or transformative in 





In this paper we show that migrant experiences are shaped by the interaction of the 
governance context within their own country as well as the countries of destination. While 
Ghana has a democratically elected government which is making serious efforts to improve 
its track record on human trafficking and migrant exploitation, it is complicit in systems that 
produce precarity and unfree labour because it has failed to develop effective measures to 
eliminate exploitative practices. Myanmar, by contrast, is ruled by a military-led government 
where the state is characterised by surveillance and control. There the state is informally 
involved in brokerage through corruption and rent-seeking as well as by turning a blind eye to 
brokerage and human trafficking. The impunity with which border control officials are 
involved in the brokerage and trafficking business in Myanmar suggests that this is made 
possible because of the powerlessness of ordinary citizens vis-à-vis the state.  
 
Our findings also clearly show that strict immigration and employment regimes in migrants 
receiving countries make legal migration much more difficult, especially for people from 
poor societies. Irregular migration was therefore the norm for labour migration in both 
countries and this made clandestine broker networks flourish. Due to the hidden nature of 
recruitment, travel and positioning in the labour market in ways that were completely “below 
the official radar”, opportunities for exploitation were created in several ways and at several 
points in the migration process and the implicit as well as explicit involvement of state actors 
in these systems was evident. The worst examples of extortion and exploitation came from 
migrants travelling to Libya, the Gulf States and Singapore. The breakdown of the 
government in Libya and agreements with Europe to arrest and deport people trying to use 
North Africa to enter Europe through irregular routes has made migrants more vulnerable to 
exploitation and forced labour. Due to the constant threat of being arrested, irregular 
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Ghanaian migrants in Libya remain invisible and this provides employers with the power to 
underpay or not pay at all, use threats of reporting them to the authorities to extract more 
work. A comparable situation existed in Singapore and the Gulf states which heavily limit the 
rights of migrant labour.  
 
Common to all scenarios was the prevalence of irregular migration and informal employment 
arrangements without official contracts. The combination of state migration control policies 
combined with insecure work and living conditions severely limit the ability of labour to 
bargain in the workplace and render them vulnerable to deportation and criminalisation 
(Strauss and McGrath, 2017; Lewis et al, 2015). However, the accounts also show how 
migrants are using brokers to position themselves in the informal economy in order to resist 
being tied to the same employer for a particular kind of work and being returned home after a 
prescribed period of time. Stringent regulations related to work permits and quotas as well as 
the duration of residence mean that those who migrate through legal channels must work in 
the job that they have been assigned and remain with the same employer. Without the 
assistance of informal brokers, it is impossible to challenge the system. Migrants’ accounts 
show that systems of brokerage can involve extreme risk and suffering as well as positioning 
of migrants in forced labour. But confounding this analysis are the findings that migrants 
continue to regard these avenues of migration as critical for entering the informal economy in 
destination countries where they have more flexibility in choosing jobs and switching 
employers. Brokers are important at every stage of migration – in applying for official 
documents if those are being sought, falsifying documents, negotiating passage with border 
authorities, arranging transport and linking up with other broker for onward journeys. They 
are also important for obtaining the necessary permits at destination in the case, renewal of 
passports and permits as well as the system of stamping passports to allow migrants to extend 
their stay outside the legal system. Put differently, migrant agency relies heavily on brokers.  
 
The ambivalence of migrant experiences shows that they are neither wholly enslaved bodies 
and nor are they able to exercise unconstrained agency. Their agency is always relational and 
the choices they make depend on their individual and family circumstances and their social 
and material context. It is these shades of grey and experiences that confound binary 
understandings of free and enslaved labour that we wish to highlight here. The findings 
presented in this paper have thus added to our understanding of the “ambiguous realities of 
the lifeworlds” (Brace and O’Connell Davidson 2018) in two hitherto under-researched 
contexts of the Global South. 
 
The accounts provided by the migrants, brokers, state officials and other stakeholders also 
show the conflicting role of the state. On the one hand, it positions itself as the only legitimate 
mediator of migration and a benevolent protector of migrant rights and safety, but it is clear 
that it also plays a critical role in facilitating irregular migration. States must therefore take 
more responsibility for their role in human trafficking and the creation of unfree labour.  
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